










 eplication esearch  
    
 
Conceptual Replication DOI: 10.17705/1atrr.00027 ISSN 2473-3458 
 
Volume 4  Paper 7  pp.  1 – 14 June 2018 
 
Protection Motivation and Deterrence: Evidence from a 
Fortune 100 Company 
David Sikolia 




Boise State University 
DougTwitchell@boisestate.edu 
 Glen Sagers 
Illinois State University 
gsagers@ilstu.edu 
Abstract: 
This paper contains a conceptual replication of Herath and Rao (2009), who tested the Integrated Protection Motivation 
Theory (PMT) and General Deterrence Theory (GDT) model of security policy compliance under the umbrella of the 
Decomposed Theory of Planned Behavior (DTPB). This study replicates their research model except for the Response 
Cost construct.  In contrast to the original study, all data for this replication comes from a single organization, and the 
survey instrument references a security policy specific to this organization, not generic security policies in multiple 
organizations. Our results, based on 437 observations, confirm some of the original findings but not all. Relationships 
stemming from Organizational Commitment, Resource Availability, Security Breach concern level and Subjective Norms 
are similar across both studies. The findings for other relationships drawn from PMT, GDT, and TPB are mixed. We 
believe that the evidence provided in this conceptual replication of the Integrated Model (Herath & Rao, 2009) supports 
the robustness of parts of the model. We encourage future research and practice to focus on replicating and confirming 
the parts of the model that are similar in both studies. 
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1  Introduction 
Numerous industry studies and surveys indicate that information systems (IS) security is a top managerial 
concern (Willison & Warkentin, 2013). One of the key problems affecting the security of information systems 
in organizations is the insider, the trusted employee or contractor with valid access to systems. The 
academic community has responded to these concerns by undertaking research focusing on organizational 
information security practices as well as individual security behaviors. 
This paper is a replication of one such study, (Herath & Rao, 2009). Their paper draws from the areas of 
Protection Motivation Theory, General Deterrence Theory, and Organizational Behavior to develop and test 
an Integrated Protection Motivation and Deterrence model of security policy compliance under the umbrella 
of the Theory of Planned Behavior. Their integrated model examines security compliance in a more holistic 
manner, which in our opinion is worthy of replication. 
The replication we perform is not an exact replication.  It is a conceptual replication, whereby we test the 
same hypotheses, but in a different context, and with a different analysis of the data.  (Dennis & Valacich, 
2014).  As noted in Dennis and Valacich’s (2014) manifesto, this type of replication can be the strongest 
form of replication, since it applies the same concepts across multiple groups with different cultures.  In this 
replication, we test their entire model except one construct.  Thus, there are three main differences between 
the studies.  First, while Herath and Rao (2009) administered the instrument to employees at a variety of 
organizations, our replication focused on a single company. Second, because of this focus, we slightly 
altered the questions to refer to a specific corporate security policy, rather than to security policies generally. 
Third, the policy we referred to had recently been changed, a change that affected all employees on the 
company network with Internet access.  These changes allow us to see whether the model is robust when 
used in a single specific environment, when referring to a specific policy, and when that policy has recently 
changed. Boundary conditions specific to each of the studies are summarized in Table 1. These are aspects 
of the “who, where, and when” of the model (Busse, Kach, & Wagner, 2016). 
 
Table 1. Boundary Conditions 
 Herath and Rao (2009)    This Study 
Number of organizations contacted 690 1 
Number of organizations indicating interest 120 1 
Number of organizations that actually participated 78 1 
Number of employees in each organization 10 1070 
Number of  usable responses 312 437 
 
According to Deterrence Theory (Straub, 1990), individuals weigh the costs and benefits before engaging 
in criminal behavior and choose crime if it pays. Thus, if an individual concludes that there is a high 
probability of being caught and the punishment is severe, then they will not engage in criminal behavior 
(Mahmood, Siponen, Straub, Rao, & Raghu, 2010; Straub, 1990). Classical deterrence theory posits that 
the certainty, severity, and celerity of punishment are factors that guide an individual’s decision to commit 
or not commit a crime (Pahnila, Siponen, & Mahmood, 2007). Celerity of punishment refers to how fast 
punishment is delivered.  General deterrence theory posits that the greater the certainty and severity of 
sanctions for a criminal act, the more individuals are deterred from the act (D’Arcy, Hovav, & Galletta, 2009). 
General deterrence theory includes three additional factors: social disapproval, self-disapproval, and 
impulsivity (Pahnilaa et al., 2007).  
Protection Motivation Theory is rooted in fear appeals and postulates that people protect themselves based 
on four factors. These four factors arise from the cognitive appraisal of two processes:  threat appraisal and 
coping response appraisal (Herath & Rao, 2009). Threat appraisal stems from the perceived severity of a 
threatening event, and the perceived probability of occurrence or vulnerability. Coping response appraisal 
stems from efficacy of the recommended preventive behavior and perceived self-efficacy (Rogers, 1975).  
Rational Choice Theory proposes that offenders weigh the costs and benefits of engaging in deviant 
behaviors before deciding to act (Li, Zhang, & Sarathy, 2010).  Individuals are sensitive to the consequences 
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of their behavior and make rational decisions based on a cost-benefit analysis of the intended behavior. The 
decision to act in an offending manner is a function of the perceived costs and perceived benefits of the 
criminal behavior (Hu, Xu, Dinev, & Ling, 2011). The perceived risks include detection probability, sanction 
severity, subjective norms, and security risks (Bulgurcu, Cavusoglu, & Benbasat, 2010). 
Based on General Deterrence Theory, Protection Motivation Theory, Theory of Planned Behavior, 
Decomposed Theory of Planned Behavior, and Organizational Commitment, Herath and Rao (2009) 
developed the following 15 hypotheses.  
Hypothesis 1: Attitudes towards information security policies will positively influence security 
policy compliance intentions. 
Hypothesis 2: The perceived severity of a potential security breach will positively affect the level 
of security breach concern. 
Hypothesis 3: The perceived probability of a security breach will positively affect the level of 
security breach concern. 
Hypothesis 4: Higher levels of security breach concern will result in more positive attitudes 
towards security policies. 
Hypothesis 5: The perceived effectiveness of one's actions will positively affect one's attitude 
towards security policies. 
Hypothesis 6: The perceived response cost will negatively influence one's attitude towards 
security policies. 
Hypothesis 7: Self-efficacy will positively influence one's attitude towards security policies. 
Hypothesis 8: Self-efficacy will positively affect intention to comply with organizational information 
security policies. 
Hypothesis 9: Resource availability will positively affect self-efficacy. 
Hypothesis 10: The severity of the penalty will positively affect the intention to comply with 
organizational information security policies. 
Hypothesis 11: The certainty of detection will positively affect the intention to comply with 
organizational information security policies. 
Hypothesis 12: Subjective norms [expectations of relevant others] will positively affect intention to 
comply with organizational information security policies. 
Hypothesis 13: Descriptive norms [behavior of similar others] will positively influence intentions to 
comply with security policies. 
Hypothesis 14: Higher levels of organizational commitment will lead to higher employee 
perceptions of the effectiveness of their actions. 
Hypothesis 15: The level of organizational commitment will positively affect the intention to follow 
security policies. 
 
Figure 1 shows their research model and the results from their data analysis. 
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Figure 1. Original Research Model and Related Results 
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2 Methodology 
We performed an empirical test of the relationships suggested in their research model on data we collected 
using a field study survey. In the following sections, we present the instrument and describe the survey 
administration and participants. 
2.1 Instrument 
We used the same instrument as the original study with adaptations to fit the specific context. The survey 
items were updated from referencing generic security policies in multiple companies, to wording that referred 
to a recent, specific policy enforcement change in a specific company.  These changes to wording, and 
administering the survey in a single company, constitute the situational differences between the original 
Herath & Rao (2009) paper and this conceptual replication.  The firm in which the survey was administered 
was a Fortune 100 company, in manufacturing and engineering.  The employees to whom the survey was 
administered worked in all business areas of the company, not just technical areas.  However, all were 
geographically at the same campus, not worldwide. 
Several weeks before the survey was administered, the company had changed a policy enforcement 
mechanism concerning Internet usage throughout the company network.  Prior to the change, only a Web 
access policy governed employees’ use of the Internet from the company’s network.  Like acceptable use 
policies at many companies, it prohibited use of the company network for activities such as accessing 
pornographic material or promoting outside businesses.  When employees attempted to access a site that 
was on a blacklist, the system blocked their access and logged the attempt.  Excessive attempts by 
employees were investigated.  In response to some violations that were difficult to track to individuals, the 
company added additional enforcement to the policy: employees were now required to login to a portal to 
be able to access Internet sites that were not on an approved list.  The purpose of the authentication was 
to help in tracking violations and to remind employees of the Internet usage policy. The company reported 
to us that their detected violations of the Web access policy fell by 44%, but did not cease, in response to 
the policy requiring authentication.  Our study, administered several weeks after the policy change, was 
intended to gauge employee response to the authentication requirement and help the company understand 
why the remaining violations occurred.   
According to company contacts who had been directly involved in its implementation, the addition of the 
authentication enforcement mechanism to the Web access policy, which was done suddenly and without 
much warning, caused significant controversy, both because it added an annoying and cumbersome 
authentication step and because it emphasized the company’s monitoring of Internet usage. To capitalize 
on this raised awareness, we included the following in our survey recruitment email: 
“In light of the changes to authenticated web access, the Firewall & Proxy server team at [company] 
and researchers at [university] have teamed up on a research project to better understand this and 
other IT security policies and their impact on the workplace. . . .” 
We did not perform an explicit manipulation check but it is reasonable to assume that the controversy, the 
daily login requirement, the recency of the change, and the recruitment email all focused the respondents’ 
attention on the policy and its enforcement.   
We administered the survey using the company’s internal web-based survey system.  Unfortunately, 
because it was inadvertently left out of the survey, we were unable to include response cost in our model. 
Table 2 lists the constructs we used, their measures, and the wording of each of those measures. In place 
of the original wording of security violation, we used Internet usage policy violation. In place of organization, 
we used company. In place of security technologies, we used Internet authentication. 




OCM1 I am willing to put in a great deal of effort beyond that normally expected in 
order to help this company to be successful. 
OCM2 I really care about the fate of this company. 





IncCert1 How likely is it that an Internet usage policy violation will cause a significant 
outage that will result in the loss of productivity? 
IncCert2 How likely is it that an Internet usage policy violation will cause a significant 
outage to the Internet that results in financial losses to organizations? 
6 Protection Motivation and Deterrence: Evidence from a Fortune 100 Company 
 
Volume 4  Paper 7  
 
IncCert3 How likely is it that the company will lose sensitive data due to an Internet 





IncSev1 I believe that information stored on company computers is vulnerable to 
security incidents due to Internet usage policy violations. 
IncSev2 I believe the productivity of the company and its employees is threatened by 
security incidents due to Internet usage policy violations. 
IncSev3 I believe the profitability of the company is threatened by security incidents 




SecConc1 Internet usage issues affect my organization directly. 
SecConc2 Internet usage issues are exaggerated. 




ResEff1 Every employee can make a difference when it comes to helping to secure the 
company information systems. 
ResEff2 There is not much that any one individual can do to help secure the company 
information systems. 
ResEff3 If I follow the organization’s Internet usage policies, I can make a difference 




ResAvail1 Assistance from the Help Desk is available when needed. 
ResAvail2 Information security policies, like the Internet usage policy, are made 
available to employees online. 
ResAvail3 Information security policies, like the Internet usage policy are written in a 
manner that is clear and understandable. 
ResAvail4 Users receive adequate security training before getting a network account. 
ResAvail5 A variety of business communications (notices, posters, newsletters, etc.) are 
used to promote security awareness. 
 
Self-efficacy 
SEff1 I would feel comfortable following most of the Internet usage policy on my 
own. 
SEff2 If I wanted to, I could easily follow the Internet usage policy on my own. 
SEff3 I would be able to follow most of the Internet usage policy even if there was 




SecPolAtt1 Adopting Internet authentication is important. 
SecPolAtt2 Adopting Internet authentication is beneficial. 




PunSev1 The organization disciplines employees who break Internet usage rules. 
PunSev2 My organization terminates employees who repeatedly break Internet usage 
policy rules. 





DetCer1 Employee Internet usage is properly monitored for policy violations. 




SubNorm1 Top management thinks I should follow company Internet authentication 
policies. 
SubNorm2 My immediate supervisor thinks that I should follow company Internet 
authentication policies. 
SubNorm3 My colleagues think that I should follow company Internet authentication 
policies. 
SubNorm4 The information security department thinks that I should follow company 
Internet authentication policies. 
SubNorm5 Other computer technical specialists in the organization think that I should 




DesNorm1 I believe other employees comply with the company’s Internet 
authentication policies. 
DesNorm2 I am convinced other employees comply with the company’s Internet 
authentication policies. 
DesNorm3 It is likely that the majority of other employees comply with the company’s 






CompInt1 I am likely to follow the company’s Internet authentication policies. 
CompInt2 It is likely that I will comply with the company’s Internet authentication policies 
to protect the organization's information systems. 
CompInt3 I am certain that I will follow the company’s Internet authentication policies. 
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2.2 Survey administration and participants 
We received 1070 responses. Of these, 589 identified as male, 238 identified as female, the rest did not 
specify their gender. The table below provides the descriptive statistics. This data includes only those who 
reported on the specific items, so all sum to 100%. 
 
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics 
  Count % 
Gender Female 238 28.8 
Male 589 71.2 
 
Education 
Graduate Degree 162 20.4 
Bachelor’s Degree 467 58.8 
Some College 126 15.9 
High School (other) 39 4.9 
 
Age 
18 - 25 26 3.1 
26 - 35 204 24.6 
36 - 45 238 28.7 
46 - 55 232 28.0 
56 and older 128 15.5 
3 Data Analysis 
We used SPSS version 22 and Amos version 23 for measurement validation and to test the structural model. 
Amos, which employs a structural equation modelling (SEM) statistical technique, was used largely for 
confirmation. 
We began by screening the data. The first step was to identify and remove any records with missing values. 
The next step was to screen for unengaged responses. Any record with a standard deviation of 0.5 or below 
was dropped from the data set.   This process left us with a sample of size of 437.  To assess common-
method bias, we ran a factor analysis in SPSS with the number of factors fixed to 1 and no rotation.  The 
un-rotated principal-component factor that emerged explained 21.12% of the variance, which is less than 
the critical 50%.  Second, the un-rotated principal-component factor analysis revealed twelve factors with 
eigenvalues greater than 1. The first factor accounted for 21.12% of the variance. All twelve factors together 
accounted for 67.14% of the variance, indicating an acceptable level of common method variance. We 
assessed discriminant validity by looking at the correlation matrix. None of the correlations between the 
factors exceed 0.7, which is within acceptable range. The Average Variance Extracted (AVE) did not meet 
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Table 4. Measurement Model Statistics 
Construct Item Factor 
Loadings 
Organizational commitment 
CR = 0.810 




Perceived probability of security breach 
CR = 0.722 




Perceived severity of security  breach 
CR = 0.833 




Security breach concern level 
CR = 0.543 





CR = 0.533  






CR = 0.734  







CR = 0.881 




Security policy attitude 
CR = 0.902 





CR = 0.870 





CR = 0.542 





CR = 0.845 







CR =  0.820  




Security policy compliance intention 
CR =  0.818 




CR = Composite Reliability; AVE = Average Variance Extracted 
 
We tested the structural model using Amos version 23. (Herath & Rao, 2009) used SmartPLS to test their 
structural model; we chose covariance-based structural equation modelling (CB-SEM) with Amos because 
our objective was to confirm that our data fit the model and because we have a larger sample. Two of the 
constructs, Subjective Norm and Resource Availability, are formative. Information systems literature has 
provided guidelines on how to analyze formative constructs via covariance-based SEM such as AMOS. The 
analysis requires the performance of a chi-square test on a number of models to determine which to use 
(Petter, Straub, & Rai, 2007). We selected the best model for the analysis (Herath & Rao, 2009), and our 
research hypotheses and related results are compared in Figure 2a and Figure 2b below. Like the original 
research, we controlled for age, education, gender, and job type. 
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Figure 2a. Herath and Rao’s (2009) Research Model and Results. 
 
 
Figure 2b. Our Model and Related Results 
 
Model fit indices meet the recommended guidelines (Gefen, Straub, & Boudreau, 2000), except for one, 
χ2/df. Two other indices, NFI and GFI are borderline close to the cutoff point. Table 5 suggests that the 
structural model has an adequate fit with the data. 
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Table 5. Model Fit Indices 
Fit Indices Heuristic Model value 
χ2  1582.590 
df  773 
χ2 / df >3.0 2.047 
NFI >0.90 0.859 
GFI >0.90 0.850 
AGFI >0.80 0.824 
CFI >0.90 0.922 
RMSEA <0.06 0.049 
 
Our results show that nearly 48% of the variance in the security policy compliance intentions and 41% of 
the variance in the security policy attitude are explained in the integrated model. 
4 Discussion 
Table 6 compares the results of the two studies. 
Table 6. Comparison of Findings 
Hypothesis Original Study Our Study Comments 
H1 0.073 0.147*** Significant in our study 
H2 0.191* 0.741*** Exceptional weight in our study 
H3 0.065 0.052 Similar findings 
H4 0.393*** 0.601*** Similar findings 
H5 0.288*** 0.181 Not significant in our study 
H6 -0.195***  Not tested in our study 
H7 0.148* -0.016 Not significant in our study 
H8 0.172* 0.112 Not significant in our study 
H9 0.505*** 0.503*** Similar findings 
H10 -0.139** 0.087 Not significant in our study 
H11 0.155** -0.203 Not significant in our study 
H12 0.313** 0.454*** Similar findings 
H13 0.101* 0.178 Not significant in our study 
H14 0.431*** 0.431*** Similar findings 
H15 0.202*** 0.223*** Similar findings 
*significant at P < 0.05 level, **significant at P < 0.01 level, ***significant at P < 0.001 level 
 
Behavioral and social sciences research involves three interrelated domains. These are the substantive 
domain or content; the conceptual domain which consists of the ideas that give meaning to the content; 
and the methodological domain which includes the techniques or procedures by which the content and 
ideas are studied (McGrath, 1995).  Our replication study uses the same procedure as (Herath & Rao, 
2009), a field study using a survey method; we tested the same concepts or research model in a different 
context, making this a conceptual replication. The only difference was in the content of interest; they 
examined a generic security policy across multiple generic organizations, whereas we examined a specific 
security policy in a specific organization. This may explain the differences in some of our results. In the 
rest of the section below, we discuss, hypothesis by hypothesis, possible theoretical reasons for the 
differences. 
H1, H7, and H8 were drawn from three theories: the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB), the Decomposed 
Theory of Planned Behavior (DTPB), and Protection Motivation Theory (PMT). Self-efficacy is the 
conviction that one can successfully execute the behavior required to produce the outcomes; attitude 
refers to the degree to which a person has a favorable or unfavorable evaluation or appraisal of the 
behavior in question; and intention is an indication of an individual’s readiness to perform a given 
behavior. Herath & Rao (2009) asked their respondents if they could easily and comfortably follow most of 
the IS security policies, whereas we asked our participants if they could easily and comfortably follow a 
specific Internet usage policy. The findings for these hypotheses are mixed, with the original study 
showing self-efficacy influencing both security policy attitudes and intention to comply with policies, but 
our study does not show the same effect. The original study found the impact of attitude on policy 
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compliance to be insignificant, but out study found the effect to be significant. These results may be 
explained by the fact that our instrument referred to specific ‘Internet Usage Policy’ in the Fortune 100 
Company, whereas the original study referred to general IS Security policies. Individuals are prone to be 
more willing to comply with a specific, concrete policy, which changed in recent memory, than to comply 
with generic security policies with details that are at likely only vaguely remembered. 
H2, H3, H4, and H5 were drawn from PMT. H6, which we did not test in our model due to inadvertent 
omission, was also drawn from PMT. PMT proposes that people protect themselves based on Threat 
Appraisal (Perceived Severity and Perceived Susceptibility) and Coping Appraisal (Perceived Response 
Efficacy and Perceived Self-Efficacy). The findings for H2, H3 and H4 are similar in both studies.  The 
beta weight for H2 in our study is high, which could be explained by the high level of Internet security 
awareness by the participants in our study. In both studies, the certainty of security breaches has no 
significant impact on security concern. On the contrary, Coping Appraisal influenced attitude in their study, 
but not in ours. This is an interesting finding that may be explained by the recency of the Internet 
authentication policy in the company.  A recent policy change, that seems cumbersome to use at first 
glance, may influence a user to be unsure about whether they will truly comply.  
H12 (Subjective Norm) and H13 (Descriptive Norm) were drawn from two theories, TPB and DTPB. TPB 
states that attitude toward behavior, subjective norms, and perceived behavioral control work together to 
shape an individual’s behavioral intentions. The original study found that social influence plays a role in 
employee security behaviors.  Both studies suggest that subjective norms, or the employees’ perception 
of what significant others think, have a significant impact on employee behaviors. However, whereas they 
found descriptive norms to be significant, our study provides no support for the influence of descriptive 
norms. In both studies, the expectations of relevant others are seen as important, but the behavior of 
similar others is not seen as significant in our study.  In both studies the strength of the relationship is 
relatively small compared to that of the subjective norm.  This should not be surprising given that what 
others do with policy compliance—especially a single policy, in a single organization (our study)—varies 
less than what others do among several policies and several organizations.   It seems likely that what 
individuals think others want them to do varies strongly across individuals, and across organizations and 
policies.  
H9 was drawn from DTPB. The findings in both studies are similar, both significant at the p < 0.001 level 
(0.505 in the original study; 0.503 in our study). Resource availability is important for employee ability to 
comply with security policies. 
H10 and H11 were drawn from General Deterrence Theory (GDT). These results are significant in the 
original study but not in our study. In the original study, they found certainty of detection to have positive 
impact on security policy compliance intentions, and the severity of penalty was found to have a significant 
impact on security behavior intentions.  In our study, H10 and H11 were not found to be significant.  In 
Herath and Rao, which studied multiple organizations, fear of sanctions varied from organization to 
organization while our study of a single organization resulted in less variation. Since H10 and H11 were 
not significant in this study, we cannot state conclusively that certainty of detection and severity of 
punishment do not work as Herath & Rao showed, but the negative relationship we found bears further 
investigation.  
H14 and H15 were drawn from Organizational Commitment Theory (OCT). The findings in both studies 
are similar, both significant at the p < 0.001 level (H14 was 0.431 original study and is 0.431 in our study; 
H15 was 0.202 in the original study and is 0.223 in our study).  This seems to indicate that organizational 
commitment is a strong force for compliance with policy, whether in the context of a specific firm, or across 
multiple firms.  This is unsurprising, as those with high organizational commitment tend to be good 
employees, who follow rules and contribute to the goals of the company. 
 
5 Conclusion 
In this paper, we present a conceptual replication of (Herath & Rao, 2009) study.  As shown in Figure 2 and 
Table 7, several of the relationships, including those stemming from Organizational Commitment, Resource 
Availability, Perceived Severity, and Subjective Norms are remarkably similar across the two studies.  Such 
consistency suggests that these relationships are robust despite the differences in the two studies.  Other 
important relationships, however, are not consistent.  The central relationships in the Theory of Planned 
Behavior between Concern Level and Attitude and between Attitude and Intention are, respectively, 
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significant but weak and not significant in Herath and Rao’s (2009) results.  In our results, these two are 
both significant and stronger than in the previous study, suggesting that the Theory of Planned Behavior 
may be a good fit in this context.  Finally, the constructs related to General Deterrence Theory and to 
Punishment Severity and Detection Certainty were significant in the previous study but not in ours.  This 
difference is likely due to the security culture and use or non-use of sanctions at the company.  
We believe the evidence presented in this conceptual replication of Herath and Rao (2009)    provides 
support for the robustness of the Integrated Protection Motivation and Deterrence model.  These two 
studies, taken together, show that the model is robust across somewhat differing contexts and that small 
changes to the instrument do not invalidate the outcomes.  These findings agree with a key point in Dennis 
and Valacich (2009): namely, they help show that there is nothing idiosyncratic about item wording. To 
further strengthen the theories behind the original study, future research should be conducted to validate 
that the constructs significant across both these studies remain significant in other scenarios.  Similarly, 
future studies may show that both significant and non-significant constructs are not applicable in other 
contexts, which ultimately can lead to a more parsimonious model. 
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